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Abstract
We study the e¤ects of hub and spoke liberalization in a model where income matters
for consumption patterns. We use a three-country Ricardian trade model in which
goods are ranked according to priority and where economies di¤er in their income
level. The poorest (richest) country has a comparative advantage in the production
of lowest-ranked (highest-ranked) goods, specializing in goods with low (high) income
elasticities in demand. The medium rich country specializes in the production of the
intermediate-ranked commodities. We nd that a countrys income level is of decisive
importance for assessing the impact of hub and spoke arrangements on welfare. Hubs
do not necessarily gain and spokes do not necessarily lose.
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1 Introduction
The recent collapse of the Doha Round is expected to generate an increase in bilateral trade
agreements. In particular, a boost in so-called hub and spoke bilateralismis expected,
where a big country, the hub, engages in a discriminatory trade agreement with a small
country, the spoke. The literature on the static e¤ects of such arrangements has made clear
that these are benecial for the hub and detrimental to the spoke(s), particularly if the
hub has many spokes (Kowalczyk and Wonnacott, 1992, Baldwin & Venables, 1995 and
Wonnacott, 1996). This insight emerges from analytical frameworks where the di¤erence
in income between countries matters only for establishing whether or not bilateral terms
of trade changes occur. Whereas changes in tari¤s by the hub leads to a terms of trade
improvement for the spoke, the changes in tari¤s of the spoke do not change the terms of
trade of the hub. Accordingly, it is intuitive that a spoke gains if it is the only country
the hub establishes a bilateral trade agreement with. If, however, the hub forms such
arrangements with more spokes, the benets of being treated preferentially disappear and
spokes might lose.
We argue that there is more to income di¤erences between countries than just having an
impact on the bilateral terms of trade. In particular, we argue that one should also include
the e¤ect of di¤erent income levels on consumption patterns. In standard trade analysis this
aspect is ignored by assuming that preferences are homothetic. That is, if income increases,
the demand for commodities increases proportionally and consumption patterns do not
change. In a world with persistent global income di¤erences, this assumption is too far-
fetched. In particular, the similarity in consumption patterns is at odds with a number of
stylized facts. First, many new, sophisticated products are developed in countries with high
per capita incomes, created by entrepreneurs in response to perceived demand. Individuals
in countries with lower per capita income tend to buy relatively unsophisticated products.
Recent evidence for this is provided by Schott (2001).1 Second, sophisticated goods are
originally developed and produced in developed countries and only at a later point in their
cycle consumed in less developed countries (Vernon, 1966). Third, the volume of trade will
be higher between countries with similar per capita income (Burenstam Linder, 1961).
The present paper analyzes the formation of hub and spoke arrangements in a frame-
work that incorporates nonhomothetic preferences. The model builds on Stibora and de
Vaal (2006a,b), where we have incorporated nonhomothetic preferences to analyze the con-
sequences of unilateral tari¤ cuts and PTA formation between countries of di¤erent income
levels. Assuming a continuum of goods in a three country Ricardian trade model, we rank
1See also Deaton and Muellbauer (1980), Hunter and Markusen (1987) and Hunter (1991).
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countries such that there is a poor country with a comparative advantage in the production
of the lower-ranked goods, a rich country with a comparative advantage in the production
of the highest-ranked goods, and a medium-rich country with a comparative advantage
in the production of intermediate-ranked goods. Nonhomotheticity in demand enters the
analysis by assuming that goods are indivisible in consumption. We suppose that the con-
tinuum of goods is also ordered according to priority in consumption. The lowest-indexed
goods have the highest priority in consumption, whereas the highest-indexed goods have
the lowest priority in consumption. Consumers rst buy high-priority goods and only
when their real income increases will they add higher-indexed goods to their consumption
baskets. The higher-indexed goods are therefore only a¤ordable to households with su¢ -
ciently high income levels. This implies that the poor (rich) country produces goods with
low (high) income elasticities in demand and the medium rich country specializes in goods
with intermediate income elasticities in demand.
In such a framework, we nd that the income level of a country greatly matters for as-
sessing the impact of hub and spoke arrangements. A hub is most likely to gain if it produces
goods with the highest-income elasticities, which is the rich country. A middle-income hub,
producing at most goods with intermediate income elasticities, is less ascertained of welfare
gains and may even lose. The main reason for this divergence is the inclusion of asymmetric
demand complementarities. Due to nonhomothetic preferences, real income gains are spent
on goods with higher demand elasticities, which is favorable to rich countries and less so for
medium-rich countries. Also for spokes the welfare e¤ects highly depend on income levels.
Richer spokes are more likely to gain than poorer spokes. However, if a spoke country is
so poor that it cannot a¤ord the higher-indexed goods that the rich country produces, it is
either shielded from welfare changes (if the rich country is the hub) or it has a fair chance
to gain as well (if the middle-income country is hub). It is therefore not only the income
di¤erences per se that matter for the welfare results of hub and spoke arrangements, but
also the extent of these income di¤erences.
We proceed with this paper as follows. In Section 2, we provide a brief discussion of the
model we introduced in Stibora and de Vaal (2006b). In Section 3 we present the general
equilibrium and welfare e¤ects of a hub and spoke arrangement with the rich country as
the hub. Likewise, Section 4 discusses welfare e¤ects if the medium-rich country is the hub.
Section 5 concludes.
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2 The Model2
We consider three countries, countries 1, 2, and 3. In each country there exists a continuum
of competitive industries, indexed by z 2 [0;1); each producing a homogeneous good also
indexed by z: There is one factor of production, labor, which is supplied in xed quantity in
each country. For good z, let aj(z) be the unit labor requirement in country j (j = 1; 2; 3).
We follow Appleyard, Conway and Field (1989) (hereafter: ACF) and make the following
assumptions on technology:
Assumption 1
ai(z)
a1(z)
 Ai(z) with   z
Ai
@Ai
@z
  i > 0 for i = 2; 3 and all z:
Assumption 2 2 < 3 for all z.
Assumption 1 is standard and requires that Ai (i = 2; 3) is smooth, continuous, and
strictly decreasing in z 2 [0;1): It ensures that commodities can be ranked in order of
diminishing comparative advantage of country 1 relative to both country 2 and 3. Assump-
tion 2 implies that A3(z) is relatively steeper than A2(z) so that A3(z)=A2(z) is strictly
decreasing in z. Assumption 2 ensures that country 3 has an increasing comparative ad-
vantage relative to country 2 for higher z.
Initially, trade ows are distorted by tari¤s. Let  jk be one plus the ad valorem tari¤
in country j on any of the commodities z when it is produced in country k. Assuming
perfect competition, a country then exports good z when it can produce that good at the
lowest cost. For given relative wages, which we denote by !i = w1=wi for i = 2; 3, it follows
that there will be six equilibrium borderline goods zk (k = 1; ::; 6), demarcating for each
country ranges of own production, exports, and non-traded goods. For given wages and
tari¤s, these borderline goods are represented by equalities in (1)-(6) (see ACF (1989),
p.151).
Country 1 will export to country 2 if and only if  21w1a1 5 w2a2 and  21w1a1 5  23w3a3
with borderline good z1 determined by
 21!2 = a2(z1)=a1(z1); (1)
country 1 will export to country 3 i¤  31w1a1 5  32w2a2 and  31w1a1 5 w3a3 with
 31!2 =  32a2(z2)=a1(z2); (2)
country 2 will export to country 1 i¤  12w2a2 5 w1a1 and  12w2a2 5  13w3a3 with
!2 =  12a2(z3)=a1(z3); (3)
2This section is a simplied version of the model introduced in Stibora & de Vaal (2006b).
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country 2 will export to country 3 i¤  32w2a2 5 w3a3 and  32w2a2 5  31w1a1 with
!2=!3 =  32a2(z4)=a3(z4); (4)
country 3 will export to country 1 i¤  13w3a3 5  12w2a2 and  13w3a3 5 w1a1 with
!3=!2 = a3(z5) 13=a2(z5) 12; (5)
and country 3 will export to country 2 i¤  23w3a3 5 w2a2 and  23w3a3 5  21w1a1 with
!3=!2 =  23a3(z6)=a2(z6): (6)
Figure 1 gives a graphical representation of the trade patterns in terms of the borderline
goods. Country 1 produces all z 2 [0; z3); of which [z2; z3] are not traded and [0; z1] and
[0; z2] are exported respectively to country 2 and 3. Country 2 produces all z 2 [z1; z6), of
which [z1; z2] and [z5; z6] are not traded and [z3; z5] and [z2; z4] are respectively exported to
country 1 and 3. Country 3, nally, produces all z 2 [z4; u3], of which [z4; z5] are not traded,
while [z5; u1] and [z6; u2] are respectively exported to country 1 and 2. Here uj denotes the
highest-indexed good z a household from country j, j = 1; 2; 3; consumes. The resulting
trade pattern satises z1 < z2 < z3 < z4 < z5 < z6 as long as (i) directly exporting good
z costs less than exporting the same good via a third country and (ii) tari¤ rates do not
di¤er too much between countries. For example, given assumptions 1 and 2 and conditions
(5) and (6), z5 < z6 holds unless  13 >  12 23 that is, if the direct tari¤ country 1 pays on
imports from country 3 is larger than the tari¤s country 1 pays on imports from country
3 when good z is imported via country 2. The exception is z3 < z4 where z4 < z3 is also
possible. We exclude this possibility and assume z3 < z4 for the rest of the analysis.3 As
we will explain later, the trade patterns depicted only hold when households in all three
countries are rich enough to consume the higher-indexed goods country 3 produces, in
contrast to ACF.
(insert Figure 1 about here)
As country 1 exports all goods of the lower spectrum of commodities, country 3 the higher-
ranked commodities, and country 2 the middle-ranked goods, local prices are determined
by pk(z) = minj[ kjwjaj(z)]:
Turning to the demand side, we assume there are Nj households in country j; each
supplying one unit of labor. The potential consumption set of a household includes the
3If z4 < z3 this would create an additional range of nontraded goods for country 2, but would otherwise
not change any of the main results.
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continuum of z 2 [0;1). All households have the same preferences V = R1
0
b(z)x(z)dz;
where x(z) = f0; 1g denotes the consumption indicator and b(z) > 0 is the utility index.
The budget constraint is given by
R1
0
p(z)x(z)dz  I. A household purchases good z,
x(z) = 1; if the utility from the last unit income spent   b(z)=p(z): We order goods
each household purchases in the same way as the ordering of goods due to comparative
advantage. This requires that the marginal utility of income is strictly decreasing in z,
that is, we assume that
b(z)
pk(z)
=
b(z)
minj[ kjwjaj(z)]
is strictly decreasing in z, for given wj and  kj. This implies that an increase in utility is
reected in the consumption of an increased number of goods rather than in the consump-
tion of higher quantities of a xed number of goods, so that we can take uj as a measure
of welfare.
Combining assumptions 1 and 2 together with the assumption of falling marginal utility
of income leads country 1 to have a comparative advantage in the production of lower-
ranked goods that poor households purchase, country 3 to have a comparative advantage
in the production of higher-ranked goods that rich households purchase, and country 2 to
have a comparative advantage in the production of intermediate-ranked goods.
Dene the minimum level of income that allows a household from country j to consume
good z as
Ej(z) 
Z z
0
pj(s)ds; (7)
where pj(z) is the minimum price of good z in country j; which is inclusive of tari¤s
whenever relevant. The tari¤ revenues generated are redistributed across households in
a lump-sum fashion. Consequently, households pay a tari¤ exclusive price for what they
import. Denoting the tari¤ rebates by TRj, the highest-indexed commodity a household in
country j with income wj + TRj is able to consume, uj, is determined by the requirement
that
Ej[uj] = wj + TRj (8)
for j = 1; 2; 3:
We now turn to the labor markets. Labor market equilibrium requires that in each
country labor supply, Nj; equals labor demand which, in turn, depends upon the demand
for nal goods. Demand for nal good z is determined by the fraction of households with
income in excess of Ej(z): Aggregate demand for good z then is the number of households
from the three countries whose income is equal or greater than Ej(z): Then integrating
the labor required to produce each good in country j over the aggregate demand gives the
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quantity of labor in country j which is demanded to produce goods consumed in country
i. In line with standard practice in trade theory, we can replace the resulting three labor
market equilibrium conditions by two balanced trade conditions, that for country 1 and
country 2 (see Appendix A for details).
Recall that goods are indivisible implying that poor households are not able to consume
the same number of goods than rich households. To ensure that households from di¤erent
countries have di¤erent income levels we assume that country 2 has an absolute advantage
relative to country 1 and that country 3 has an absolute advantage relative to country 2
for all z. As a consequence, !2 < 1 < !2=!3; making country 1 the poor country, country 2
the medium rich country, and country 3 the rich country. Taken together, the assumption
on absolute productivity and the assumptions on the ranking of goods imply that the poor
country has a comparative advantage in the production of lower-ranked goods purchases by
poor households, the rich country has a comparative advantage in the production of higher-
ranked purchased by rich households, and the medium-rich country has a comparative
advantage in the production of intermediate-ranked goods. Put di¤erently, the poor (rich)
country produces goods with low (high) income elasticities in demand and the medium rich
country specializes in goods with intermediate income elasticities in demand.
How poor country 1 is depends on the income level of households from that country in
equilibrium. Suppose that country 1s absolute productivity di¤erences with country 2 are
considerable, ceteris paribus. To preserve labor market equilibrium country 1s factor terms
of trade have to fall, which is equivalent to a decline in real income. The fall in real income
forces households from country 1 to cut back their consumption of higher-ranked goods.
This generates two possible equilibrium congurations depending on where households
from country 1 spend their last unit of income. The rst equilibrium outcome holds that
households in each country spend their last unit of income on goods produced in country 3.
The resulting trade pattern is characterized by two-way bilateral trade ows between any
pair of countries so that we refer to this equilibrium conguration as the symmetric trade
equilibrium (henceforth: STE). The conditions for balanced trade become, for country 1
N1(1 
Z z3
0
a1(s)ds) = N2
Z z1
0
a1(s)ds+N3
Z z2
0
a1(s)ds; (9)
and for country 2,
N2(1 
Z z6
z1
a2(s)ds) = N1
Z z5
z3
a2(s)ds+N3
Z z4
z2
a2(s)ds: (10)
The left-hand-side of (9) [(10)] denotes the value of country 1s [country 2s] imports and the
right-hand-side the corresponding value of exports. The highest-indexed good uj associated
with STE, is derived from (8) and is given by
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Z z3
0
a1(s)ds+
Z z5
z3
a2(s)
!2
ds+
Z u1
z5
a3(s)
!3
ds = 1 (11)Z z1
0
a1(s)ds+
Z z6
z1
a2(s)
!2
ds+
Z u2
z6
a3(s)
!3
ds =
1
!2
(12)Z z2
0
a1(s)ds+
Z z4
z2
a2(s)
!2
ds+
Z u3
z4
a3(s)
!3
ds =
1
!3
: (13)
The absence of any tari¤terms is due to the fact that households pay a tari¤exclusive prices
as a result of tari¤ rebates. We note that STE corresponds to what has been illustrated in
Figure 1.
The second equilibrium conguration that may result is when households from country
1 are too poor to consume country 3 goods, so that they spend their last unit of income on
goods produced in country 2, while households in country 2 and 3 still spend their marginal
income on goods produced in country 3. As this equilibrium conguration also involves
one-way trade ows, we refer to it as the asymmetric trade equilibrium (henceforth: ATE).4
The conditions for balanced trade become for country 1
N1(1 
Z z3
0
a1(s)ds) = N2
Z z1
0
a1(s)ds+N3
Z z2
0
a1(s)ds (14)
and for country 2
N2(1 
Z z6
z1
a2(s)ds) = !2N1(1 
Z z3
0
a1(s)ds) +N3
Z z4
z2
a2(s)ds: (15)
Since u1 < z5; the budget constraint of country 1 household, (11), changes intoZ z3
0
a1(s)ds+
Z u1
z3
a2(s)
!2
ds = 1; (16)
while the budget constraints for country 2 and 3 remain (12) and (13), respectively. ATE
therefore satises z1 < ::: < u1 < z5 < z6 < u2 < u3, making z5 redundant in the analysis
(and in Figure 1).
In contrast to the standard literature on hub and spoke arrangements (see, for example,
Wonnacott,1975, Kowalczyk and Wonnacott, 1992, and Krugman, 1993), the assumed
preferences in our set-up imply that goods are not gross substitutes. In our model, if the
price of lower-indexed goods declines, consumers do not substitute toward relatively cheaper
4As such, our framework also provides an alternative, demand-side explanation for the asymmetries in
bilateral trade ows Helpman et al. (2005) have recently drawn attention to. They claim that for about
10% of all country pairs trade is one-way only. Taking into account that nearly half of all country pairs do
not trade with each other, this implies that roughly 20% of all bilateral trade ows is one-way.
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goods but instead expand the consumption basket always toward higher-indexed goods, as
a result of the higher purchasing power. On the other hand, if the price of higher-indexed
good falls, consumers do not switch expenditures towards lower-ranked goods. The income
e¤ect makes higher-ranked goods complements to lower-ranked goods.
Comparing the balanced trade conditions of STE, (9) and (10), with those from ATE,
(14) and (15), shows that direct income e¤ects only a¤ect the balanced trade conditions of
the latter. This is due to nonhomothetic preferences and the intuition is as follows. Consider
the e¤ects of an increase in the factor reward in country 2, ceteris paribus.5 In STE, this
raises the real income of country 2 households with respect to imported goods, which is
used to expand consumption baskets with goods from country 3. Likewise, it diminishes
real income of country 1 and country 3 households  they face higher import prices for
country 2 which reduces spending on country 3 goods. With trade initially balanced,
these spending e¤ects exactly cancel out, leaving a net change in spending on goods from
country 3 of zero. A similar reasoning implies for changes in the factor rewards of the other
countries, explaining why !2 and !3 do not enter the STE trade balance conditions. For
ATE this is di¤erent. Households in country 1 are then too poor to buy the higher-indexed
goods from country 3 and the decline in their real incomes a¤ects spending on country
2 goods instead. Since this is unmatched by any of the other spending e¤ects the real
income e¤ects of country 2 and country 3 households still apply to country 3 goods the
net e¤ect on spending on country 2 goods is negative and !2 enters the balanced trade
condition of country 2.6 This novel aspect allows us to analyze the consequences of hub
and spoke formations on trade and welfare in a multiregional setting in the presence of
signicant income e¤ects in a tractable manner.
3 Hub and spoke with the rich country as hub
We now proceed with investigating the e¤ects of a hub and spoke arrangement, with the
rich country, country 3, as the hub. This implies that country 3 liberalizes trade with
country 2 and 1, but countries 2 and 1 do not liberalize trade between them. The mutual
reduction of tari¤s on trade ows between the hub and the spokes implies that country 3
enjoys preferential access in both spoke markets. This essentially boils down to considering
5Direct income e¤ects due to tari¤ changes are absent as consumers actually pay tari¤-exclusive prices.
6Applying analogue reasoning to changes in the factor rewards of the other countries explains why !2
does not show up in the trade balance of country 1 and why !3 does not show up in either of the two trade
balance equations. The former is because none of the spending e¤ects apply to country 1 goods. The latter
is because changes in the factor reward of country 3 have no bearing on spending on country 2 goods.
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the general equilibrium and welfare e¤ects of a simultaneous and proportional reduction
in  13,  31,  23, and  32. The simultaneous solution of the relevant equations is given in
Appendix B.
The e¤ects on e¢ cient production and the terms of trade are given in Table 1. We see
that the formation of a hub and spoke system with country 3 as a hub does neither a¤ect
e¢ cient production of spoke country 1, that is, z1, z2 and z3 do not change; nor does it
a¤ect the bilateral terms of trade of country 1 vis-à-vis country 2, !2. The bilateral terms
of trade of country 3 vis-à-vis both of its spokes improve, provided the population size of
country 1 and 2 exceeds that of the hub. E¢ cient production of both countries changes
accordingly.
To understand these e¤ects it is useful to distinguish between two e¤ects. The rst e¤ect,
the supply side e¤ect, is that when tari¤s fall the competitiveness of industries is a¤ected.
The second e¤ect, the demand side e¤ect, involves that the change in competitiveness a¤ects
the ranges of non-traded goods, leading to real income and concomitant spending e¤ects.7
The spending e¤ects either accrue to country 3 (STE) or to country 2 and country 3 (ATE).
Both the supply side and the demand side e¤ect determine the impact on derived labor
demand and relative wages, leading to the comparative static e¤ects that are presented in
Table 1.
(insert Table 1 about here)
Consider the initial supply side e¤ect of the tari¤ cuts when country 3 is the hub.
Keeping wages xed, these are given by:8
bz1b = bz2b = bz3b = 0; bz4b =  1 < 0; bz5b = bz6b = 1 > 0;
where a hat above a variable indicates a relative change, e.g. b is dened as d= .9 As
both spokes do not change tari¤ between them, their relative competitive position on
each others market is una¤ected and z1 and z3 do not change. Likewise, their relative
competitive position on the market of the hub z2 does not change, as country 3 reduces its
tari¤s on the imports from both spokes proportionally. The competitive position of country
3 vis-à-vis country 2 on country 1s market of course enhances (z5 goes down as country 1
does not reduce tari¤on imports from country 2), while the mutual tari¤ reduction between
7Recall that there are no direct spending e¤ects of tari¤ reductions due to the tari¤ rebates.
8The e¤ect on z5 only arises in STE.
9By concentrating on marginal tari¤ changes in contrast to complete discrimination our results shed
light on the initial e¤ects of the formation of a system of hub and spokes.
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country 2 and 3 enhances these countriescompetitive position on each others markets,
increasing z4 and decreasing z6.
The extent to which the tari¤ changes a¤ect competitiveness depends on the degree of
comparative advantage at the specic borderline commodity. This is indicated by , which
measures the relative comparative advantage of country 3 versus country 2. It is important
as it determines the degree of industries lost or gained due to tari¤ changes. For instance,
if  is small, country 3s comparative advantage vis-à-vis country 2 is weak at z5, enabling
country 2 to take over a considerable number of country 3s export industries from country
1.
Next consider the resulting spending e¤ects. The net e¤ect of the competition e¤ects
is that solely the ranges of non-traded goods of country 2 and 3 diminish, resulting in real
income gains for these two countries. These gains become e¤ective by being used to expand
consumption baskets with goods from the hub. This holds for both types of equilibria, as
the real income e¤ects only concern country 2 and country 3.
The spending e¤ects exert a positive e¤ect on country 3s termss of trade, but as
indicated in the table, the marginal expenditure e¤ects at the borderline commodities are
crucial in determining the eventual signs of !2=!3 and !3. As we have seen, the competition
e¤ects causes country 3 to export more to country 1 and country 2, while country 2 exports
less to country 1, but more to country 3. This implies that country 3s terms of trade with
both trading partners improve if the increase of country 3s exports to both spokes exceeds
the increase of country 3s imports from spoke country 2, that is ifN1a2(z5)z5+N2a2(z6)z6 >
N3a2(z4)z4.
The welfare e¤ects are presented in Table 2. In our setup, welfare changes can be
dened by changes in the highest-indexed good a household consumes, uj, j = 1; 2; 3 (see
Matsuyama 2000). These changes are listed in Table 2 (see Appendix C for details of
derivations). In general, the expression for measuring the impact on welfare brought about
by the formation of a system of hub and spokes can be decomposed into a factor terms of
trade e¤ects, weighted by the countrys value of imports, and into real income e¤ects, that
arises because of changes in the range of non-traded goods. As can be observed from the
table, households from country 1 may lose (STE) or are una¤ected from this policy change
(ATE). While in the former case country 1 su¤ers a loss as it sees its terms of trade with
country 3 deteriorate, since there is no change in its non-traded goods area, in the latter
case country 1 is shielded from the negative impact of the terms of trade deterioration as
it does not import from country 3. Country 2 and country 3 gain under both equilibrium
congurations, provided that the relative comparative advantage vis-à-vis one another is
low, that is, for su¢ ciently small . This implies such large reductions of the non-traded
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ranges for both countries that it also compensates the negative terms of trade movements
for country 2. Under this condition, the gains from lower prices give households from
country 2 and 3 incentive to expand their range of consumption toward higher-indexed
goods, that is, du2 > 0; du3 > 0; with the result that new industries in country 3 come into
existence.
(insert Table 2 about here)
4 Hub and spoke with middle-income country as hub
Consider next the formation of a hub and spoke system where the middle-income country,
country 2, is the hub. This is in line with recent developments in East-Asia, where countries
increasingly seek open market access with China, even if their per capita income is higher
than Chinas. This corresponds to a simultaneous reduction in  12,  21,  32 and  23. The
general equilibrium e¤ects are given in Table 3.
(insert Table 3 about here)
The direct competition e¤ects are given by
bz1b =   12 < 0; bz2b = bz3b = 12 > 0; bz4b = bz5b =  1 < 0; bz6b = 1 > 0;
where also in this case the e¤ect on z5 only arises in STE. With the hub country now being
contiguous to both spokes, all borderline commodities are a¤ected. Country 1 gains better
access to the hubs market (z1 up), while the hub nds it easier to directly compete with
domestic rms in country 1 (z3 down). Likewise, country 3 loses some of its industries to the
hub (z4 up), but also gains industries from the hub market (z6 down). The hub, nally, also
gains in competitiveness with respect to either spoke country on the market of the other
spoke country (z2 down and z5 up). The extent of these competition e¤ects depends on the
relative comparative advantage of countries at their borderline commodities. The strength
of comparative advantage between the hub and country 1 is governed by 2, a¤ecting z1; z2
and z3; the strength of comparative advantage between the hub and country 3 is governed
by , a¤ecting z4; z5 and z6.
The net e¤ect of these competition e¤ects is that the two ranges of non-traded goods of
the hub diminish, while the e¤ect on the non-traded goods ranges of the spoke countries are
unclear. Whatever the case, the real income e¤ects that follow are either not spent in the
hub (STE), or only partly (ATE). In the latter case only the real income e¤ects of the poor
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country 1 concern changes in spending on the hubs industries. All other spending e¤ects
concern spoke country 3. As a consequence, the general equilibrium e¤ects are di¤erent
compared to the situation with the rich country as hub. In particular, it helps to explain
why, despite being a spoke, the bilateral terms of trade of country 3 still tends to improve.
As Table 3 indicates, 2 is important for assessing results. Recall that the model does
not impose any restrictions on its value. Suppose that the unit labor requirements between
country 1 and country 2 are ceteris paribus more equalized, that is 2 is small for given
 > 0. In this case, the competitive e¤ects on z1, z2, and z3 dominate the initial competition
and subsequent spending e¤ects. As z2 comes down, the derived demand for country 1s
labor by country 3 decreases, in favor of demand for country 2s labor. Consequently, !3
must decline to restore labor market equilibrium. Likewise, the decrease of z3 diminishes
the derived demand for country 1s labor, though this is countered by the labor market
e¤ect of the increase of z1. This explains why the negative sign for !2 is independent of
the particular value of 2 and instead depends on the marginal expenditure of the three
countries at the borderline commodities that concern country 1. The e¤ect on the bilateral
terms of trade of country 2 versus country 3 is unclear, except if country 1 is too poor to
import from country 3. Then the negative real income e¤ects in country 1 that follow the
decline in !2 and !3 imply a reduction in demand for country 2 labor, tipping the terms
of trade balance in favor of spoke country 3.
The concomitant welfare e¤ects are presented in Table 4. As before, the welfare e¤ects
can be decomposed in factor terms of trade e¤ects, weighted by the countrys value of
imports, and in a change in real income that arises because of changes in the range of non-
traded goods. From the table we infer that welfare of spoke country 3 increases under both
equilibrium congurations, du3 > 0, provided the reduction in the non-traded goods ranges
of the hub are large enough ( and/or 2 are low). The lower prices of lower-indexed goods
brought about by integration leads households of country 3 to expand their consumption
basket toward higher-indexed goods, thereby creating an environment for new rms to enter
the market of the rich country. Similarly, the real income gains in the hub are spent in
country 3, explaining the positive welfare e¤ect. By the same token, the hub gains if the
decrease in its non-traded goods range with country 3 dominates (that is, if  is su¢ ciently
small), but not if the decrease in the non-traded goods range contiguous to country 1
dominates (that is if 2 is su¢ ciently small and  >> 0). This subtlety disappears in ATE,
as then the welfare gains of country 1 accrue to the hub instead to country 3. Country 1
loses unambiguously under STE (du1 < 0).
(insert Table 4 about here)
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5 Conclusion
This paper examines the e¤ects of hub and spoke arrangements on resource allocation and
welfare when countries di¤er in their stage of economic development. Traditionally, inter-
national economists have made the simplifying assumption of homothetic preferences when
analyzing trade liberalization schemes, implying that all goods have the same unitary in-
come elasticities and that poor and rich households consume all available goods in the same
proportion. In light of a growing trend towards bilateral trade liberalizations between a
rich(er) country (the hub) and poorer countries (the spokes), we analyze such arrangements
in a framework that takes the implications of income di¤erences on consumption patterns
seriously. We use a three-country Ricardian trade model in which consumers rank goods
according to priority. The poorest country, country 1, has a comparative advantage in the
production of lower ranked goods and specializes in goods with lower income elasticities in
demand. The richest country, country 3, has a comparative advantage in the production of
the highest-ranked goods and specializes in goods with higher income elasticities in demand.
The medium-rich country, country 2, has a comparative advantage in the production of the
intermediate-ranked commodities. Goods at the lower end of the spectrum are consumed
by all households and when income increases households add higher-ranked goods to their
consumption basket.
Within this framework it appears that the income level of a country greatly matters for
assessing the e¤ects of hub and spoke arrangements on its welfare. A hub is most likely to
gain if it produces goods with the highest-income elasticities. In our framework that is the
rich country, where all households are rich enough to (also) buy these goods. A middle-
income hub, which produces goods with intermediate income elasticities at most, is less
ascertained of welfare gains and may even lose. The main reason for this divergence is the
inclusion of asymmetric demand complementarities. As a fall in the prices of lower-ranked
goods leads to real income gains that are spent on goods with higher demand elasticities,
which is favorable to rich countries and less so for medium-rich countries. Also for spokes
we nd that welfare e¤ects highly depend on income levels. Richer spokes are more likely
to gain than poorer spokes. This relation is non-monotonic, however. If a spoke country
is so poor that it cannot a¤ord the higher-indexed goods that the rich country produces,
it is either shielded from welfare changes (if the rich country is the hub) or it has a fair
chance to gain (if the middle-income country is hub). It is therefore not only the income
di¤erences per se that matter for the welfare results of hub and spoke arrangements, but
also the extent of these income di¤erences.
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A Labor market equilibria
Aggregate demand for good z from country j is Qj(z) = NjEj(z), for j = 1; 2; 3: As country
1 produces only goods in [0; z3), of which [0; z1] are exported to country 2 and [0; z2] are
exported to country 3, labor market equilibrium in country 1 has to satisfy:
N1 =
R z3
0
a1(z)Q1(z)dz +
R z2
0
a1(z)Q3(z)dz +
R z1
0
a1(z)Q2(z)dz: (A.1)
The left hand side denotes labor supply, and the right hand side is the derived demand for
country 1s labor. Substituting for Qj(z) and using the denition of (7), this becomes
w1L1 = N1E1(z3) +
N2
 21
E2(z1) +
N3
 31
E3(z2)
with E2(z1) =  21
R z1
0
w1a1(s)ds; E3(z2) =  31
R z2
0
w1a1(s)ds; and E1(z3) =
R z3
0
w1a1(s)ds.
Similar reasoning applies to get the labor market equilibrium conditions for country 2 and 3.
The three labor market equilibrium conditions can be replaced by the equivalent statement
that in equilibrium trade has to be balanced. This yields equations (9)-(10) in the main
text for STE and (14), (15) for ATE. The concomitant budget constraints are given by
(11)-(13) for STE and by (16) and (12)-(13) for ATE. The six equations that determine
e¢ cient production, together with the balanced trade conditions and the budget constraints
jointly determine the equilibrium values of the marginal goods z1   z6, the relative wage
rates !i ( w1=wi) for i = 2; 3, and the utility levels uj for j = 1; 2; 3.
B General equilibrium e¤ects of tari¤ changes
B.1 Symmetric spending equilibrium
The symmetric equilibrium is contained in the six equations for e¢ cient production (1)-
(6), the balanced trade conditions (9)-(10), and the budget conditions (11), (12) and (13).
Rewriting conditions(1)-(6) in percentage form yields
bz1 =   12 [b!2 + b 21] ; bz4 = 1 [b!2   b!3   b 32] ;bz2 =   12 [b 31 + b!2   b 32] ; bz5 = 1 [b!2   b!3 + b 13   b 12] ;bz3 =   12 [b!2   b 12] ; bz6 = 1 [b!2   b!3 + b 23] :
(B.1)
where 2 > 0;   3  2 > 0; and where we have applied our assumption that 2(zi) = 2
and 3(zi) = 3;8i.
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Total di¤erentiation of (9) and (10), making use of (1)-(6) and (11)-(13) and evaluated
at  ik =  ij for i; j; k = 1; 2; 3 and i 6= j; k yields
" b!2b!3
#
=
1
D
"

22 0

21 
11
#
26666666664
t11  t21
 t12 t22
 t13 t23
 t14 t24
 t15 t25
t16  t26
37777777775
T 26666666664
b 12b 13b 21b 23b 31b 32
37777777775
; (B.2)
where the superscript T represents the transpose of a vector. The determinant D =

11
22 > 0 since

11 = N1a1(z3)z3 +N2a1(z1)z1 +N3a1(z2)z2 > 0;

21 = 
22 + [N1a2(z3)z3 +N2a2(z1)z1 +N3a2(z2)z2] > 0;

22 = 2 [N1a2(z5)z5 +N2a2(z6)z6 +N3a2(z4)z4] > 0:
With
t11 = N1a1(z3)z3;
t13 = N2a1(z1)z1;
t15 = N3a1(z2)z2;
t12 = 0;
t14 = 0;
t16 = N3a1(z2)z2;
t21 = N1 [2a2(z5)z5 + a2(z3)z3] ;
t23 = N2a2(z1)z1;
t25 = N3a2(z2)z2;
t22 = 2N1a2(z5)z5;
t24 = 2N2a2(z6)z6;
t26 = N3 [2a2(z4)z4 + a2(z2)z2] :
It is helpful to recognize that

22   
21 =   [N1a2(z3)z3 +N2a2(z1)z1 +N3a2(z2)z2] < 0;
=  !2 [N1a1(z3)z3= 12 +N2a1(z1)z1 21 +N3a1(z2)z2] < 0;

21   
11!2 = 
22 + !2[N1a1(z3)z3( 112   1) +N2a1(z1)z1( 21   1)];
= 
22 + [N1a2(z3)z3(1   12) +N2a1(z1)z1!2( 21   1)];

21   
11!2= 12 = 
22 + !2
h
N2a1(z1)z1( 21   112 ) +N3a1(z2)z2(1  112 )
i
> 0;

21   
11!2 21 = 
22   !2[N1a1(z3)z3( 21   112 ) +N3a1(z2)z2( 21   1)];
where we make use of (1)-(6) and the assumption that  ik =  ij for i; j; k = 1; 2; 3 and
i 6= j; k: Substituting the elements tij into (B.2) and (B.1) makes it possible to derive the
results shown in the tables of the text. For calculating the e¤ects of hub and spokes, it
su¢ ces to add the e¤ects of the relevant tari¤ changes.
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B.2 Asymmetric spending equilibrium
The asymmetric equilibrium is contained in the six equations for e¢ cient production (1)-
(6), the balanced trade conditions (14) and (15), and the budget conditions (16), (12) and
(13). The percentage change in relative wages can then be deduced from the following
system:
" b!2b!3
#
=
1eD
" e
22 0e
21 e
11
#
26666664
s11  s21
 s13 s23
s14 s24
 s15 s25
s16  s26
37777775
T 26666664
b 12b 21b 23b 31b 32
37777775 ; (B.3)
with eD = e
22e
11 > 0 and
e
11 = N1a1(z3)z3 +N2a1(z1)z1 +N3a1(z2)z2 > 0;e
22 = 2 [N2a2(z6)z6 +N3a2(z4)z4] > 0;e
21 = !2N1 2(1  R z30 a1(s)ds) + a1(z3)z3
+N2 [a2(z1)z1 + 2a2(z6)z6] +N3 [a2(z2)z2 + 2a2(z4)z4] > 0:
With
s11 = N1a1(z3)z3
s13 = N2a1(z1)z1;
s15 = N3a1(z2)z2;
s12 = 0;
s14 = 0;
s16 = N3a1(z2)z2 > 0;
s21 = N1!2a1(z3)z3;
s23 = N2a2(z1)z1;
s25 = N3a2(z2)z2;
s22 = 0;
s24 = 2N2a2(z6)z6;
s26 = N3 [2a2(z4)z4 + a2(z2)z2] :
It is helpful to recognize that
e
21 = e
22 + !2N1 2(1  R z30 a1(s)ds) + a1(z3)z3
+[N2a2(z1)z1 +N3a2(z2)z2] > 0;e
21   !2e
11 = e
22 + !2 2N1(1  R z30 a1(s)ds) +N2a1(z1)z1( 21   1) > 0;e
21    21!2e
11 = e
22 + !2 2N1(1  R z30 a1(s)ds)  (N1a1(z3)z3 +N3a1(z2)z2)( 21   1) :
Substituting the elements sij into (B.3) and (B.1) makes it possible to derive the results
for the asymmetric trade equilibrium.
19
C Welfare expressions
In this part of the appendix we derive the welfare expressions used to derive the welfare
e¤ects of hub and spoke arrangements. The welfare e¤ects follow from total di¤erentiation
of equations (11)-(13) for the STE and equations (16), (12) and (13) for the ATE. For STE,
we calculate for country 1
a3(u1)du1 = a3(z5)z5bz5   !3a1(z3)z3bz3   !3
!2
[a2(z5)z5bz5   a2(z3)z3bz3]
+
!3
!2
Z z5
z3
a2(s)dsb!2 + Z u1
z5
a3(s)dsb!3:
When we use (1)-(6), and apply our assumption that each country imposes the same tari¤
rate on its imports regardless of the country of origin, we get
a3(u1)du1 =
!3
!2
R z5
z3
a2(s)dsb!2 + R u1z5 a3(s)dsb!3 + !3!2a2(z3)z3(1   12)bz3 (B.4)
Applying analogous methodology to the other two countries, we get for country 2
a3(u2)du2 =  !3!2
h
1  R z6
z1
a2(s)ds
i b!2 + R u2z6 a3(s)dsb!3
+!3a1(z1)z1( 21   1)bz1   a3(z6)z6( 23   1)bz6 (B.5)
and for country 3
a3(u3)du3 =
!3
!2
Z z4
z2
a2(s)dsb!2   1  Z u3
z4
a3(s)ds
 b!3 + ( 32   1)!3
!2
a2(z4)z4bz4: (B.6)
For ATE, the expressions for country 2 and country 3 are the same. The expression for
country 1 becomes, instead of (B.4):
a2(u1)du1 =
Z u1
z3
a2(s)dsb!2   ( 12   1)a2(z3)z3bz3: (B.7)
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Tables and Figures
Table 1: General equilibrium results with country 3 as hub
A mutual decline in d 23 = d 13 = d 31 = d 32 gives rise to:
z1 z2 z3 z4 z5 z6 !2 !3 !2=!3
symmetric equilibrium: 0 0 0 +     0  1 +1
asymmetric equilibrium: 0 0 0 + n.a.   0  1 +1
1if N1a2(z5)z5 +N2a2(z6)z6 > N3a2(z4)z4
Table 2: Welfare e¤ects with country 3 as hub
A mutual decline in d 23 = d 13 = d 31 = d 32 gives rise to:
 symmetric asymmetric
Country 1 (u1)  1 0
Country 2 (u2) +2 +2
Country 3 (u3) +2 +2
1if N1a2(z5)z5 +N2a2(z6)z6 > N3a2(z4)z4; 2if  ! 0
Table 3: General equilibrium results with country 2 as hub
A mutual decline in d 12 = d 21 = d 32 = d 23 gives rise to:
z1 z2 z3 z4 z5 z6 !2 ! 3 !2=!3
symmetric equilibrium: +     + + +1/ 2  3  1 ?
asymmetric equilibrium: +     +1=+2 n.a. +1/ 2  3  1 +1
1if 2 ! 0; 2if  ! 0; 3if N1a1(z3)z3  N2a1(z1)z1 +N3a1(z2)z2 > 0:
Table 4: Welfare e¤ects with country 2 as hub
A mutual decline in d 12 = d 21 = d 32 = d 23 gives rise to:
 symmetric asymmetric
Country 1 (u1)  3 +1
Country 2 (u2)  3=+2 +2
Country 3 (u3) +1=+2 +1=+2
1if 2 ! 0; 2if  ! 0; 3if 2 ! 0 and  >> 0:
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 Figure 1: Production and trade patterns 
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